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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
EARLY GILBERT HODGES, JR.,

Case No. 890086-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The right to due process requires that in order to find a
person in violation of his probation, the trial court must make
specific findings so as to clarify the evidence on which it relied.
Even if it had attmpted to make such findings, there was
insufficient evidence before the court for it to find that
Mr. Hodges had failed to comply with the specific term of his
probation that he participate in the Bonneville Sex Offenders
Program.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 20

day of May, 1990.

^#/vS>
JOAN C.^WATT

DELIVERED by

this

of May, 1990.

- 2 -

day

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890086-CA
Priority No. 2

EARLY GILBERT HODGES, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The statements of jurisdiction, issues, case, and facts are
set forth in Appellant's opening brief.

Appellant replies to

Appellee's brief as follows:

ARGUMENT
POINT. MR. HODGES' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE TERMINATED HIS
PROBATION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE,
A. THE TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE TRIAL
JUDGE'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS; NOR DOES IT CLARIFY THE
EVIDENCE HE RELIED ON.
The State is correct in asserting that in Morishita v.
Morris, 621 P.2d 691, 693 n.l (Utah 1980) fMorishita I). the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
We are aware of the due process requirements set
forth in Gaanon v. Scarpelli [citation omitted], for
probation revocation proceedings, yet find the
requirement for written findings inapplicable in the
instant case. First, the standards set forth in
Gaanon were addressed to administrative revocation
proceedings which required no transcript, no

judicial moderator, and no counsel, as opposed to
the instant circumstance of a judicial proceeding
with probationer being represented by counsel and a
transcript being maintained.1
Implicit in Morishita I, as clarified in Morishita v.
Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983), is the idea that written
findings are not required only if the transcript and record clarify
the basis for the revocation.
In State v. Parsons, 717 P.2d 99 (N.M. App. 1986) (cited by
the State on p. 12 of its brief), the Court held that the trial
court was required to adopt specific findings of fact or "indicate
in the record its determination of whether defendant had the ability
to pay the sums ordered and whether defendant's failure to pay was
willful."

The Court noted:

Black fv. Romano1. however, finds that in a
revocation hearing, procedural due process is
satisfied where probationer has an opportunity to
present mitigating evidence and to argue
alternatives to imprisonment and, additionally, the
factfinder states the reason for its decision and
the evidence relied on.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).

In the absence of such specific

findings, the court remanded the case for additional findings.
In the present case, the trial judge apparently violated
Mr. Hodges7 probation because Appellant failed to participate in the

1

Such statement was made in a footnote and is not the
holding of the case. In Morishita I. the defendant raised his claim
that the trial court had not entered written findings for the first
time in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Court held that the
petitionees claim did not affect the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings, especially in view of the fact that a transcript of the
proceedings had been made and therefore could not be raised for the
first time in a habeas proceeding.
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Bonneville Program,

A review of the transcript fails to elucidate

what specific acts Mr. Hodges did or did not do which led to the
trial judge's conclusion.

Mr. Hodges was informed only that he

failed to "fully participate" (T 37-8) as the trial judge defined
that term, and that although he did some things, he did not
"effectively participate" in the program (T 38-9).

The transcript

in this case is not an adequate substitute for written findings.

B. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT
MR. HODGES VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION.
The State argues that application of the rationale in
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), to the instant case is
improper because in Black v. Romano. 471 U.S. 606 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court "specifically declined to extend Bearden beyond
indigency cases . . . ."

State's brief at 10-11.

Such argument

breathes too much life into the quoted statement in Romano.
In Romano, the issue was whether the due process clause
required "a sentencing court to indicate that it has considered
alternatives to incarceration before revoking probation."

471 U.S.

at 607. While the Court was unwilling to extend Bearden to require
such a consideration of alternatives, it does not follow that the
substantive cine process limitatioi I of Bearden is not applicable to
other contexts.

Concededly, Bearden is not directly on point in the

instant case; nevertheless, the concerns espoused in Bearden
regarding an individual's interest in remaining on probation and the
existence of substantive due process limits on revocation of such

- 3 -

probation are applicable.

See State v. Parsons, 717 P.2d 99, 120

(N.M. App. 1986) (cited by the State at p. 12 of its brief) ("In
Black [v. Romano]. the court observed that due process imposes
procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of a defendant's
conditional liberty interest created by probation").
The statute discussed by the Court in Williams v. Harris,
149 P.2d 640 (Utah 1944), (cited by the State at p. 12 of its
brief), is significantly different from the statute in effect when
the trial court sentenced Mr. Hodges. Nevertheless, Williams points
out that "the right of personal liberty and suspended sentence 'may
not be alternatively granted and denied without just cause'"
[citation omitted] and that the legislature "never intended that
trial courts should implant hope and faith into one with the right
to destroy this as a whim, without just cause."

149 P.2d at 642.

In State v. Cowdell. 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981), the
Court acknowledged that although "[t]he decision of a trial court to
modify or revoke a probation is basically a discretionary one, . . .
in revoking a probation, a court may not ignore fundamental precepts
of fairness protected by the due process clause."

The Court

determined that although a "pleading in a criminal case may not be
defective for failure to allege the time a particular offense
occurred," notice for a probation revocation requires that an
allegation as to the time of the alleged occurrence be included in
order to comport with due process.

The rationale for the more

stringent protection in a probation revocation proceeding than in a
trial is that the probationer has not had a prior hearing or
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discovery, and requires the notice to adequately present
controverting evidence.

Hence, in some instances, due process

actually requires greater protection in a probation revocation
hearing than in a criminal trial.
Various cases dealing with probation revocation suggest
that a probationer must "abuse[] this opportunity" in order to
revoke probation.

State v. Dubish, 696 P.2d 969, 974 (Kan. 1985);

see State v. Bonza. 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944) ("As long as the
defendant to whom leniency has been extended keeps faith with the
court and the agency which supervises his probation, he is entitled
to the benefit of the probation or suspension"); see also State v.
Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971) ("[F]airness and effective
use of probation demand that a defendant who is placed on probation
should have the assurance that if he keeps the conditions of his
probatioi :i i t will contd .nue

")

In the present case, although

the therapists concluded that Mr. Hodges would need four years to
complete the program, all of the underlying acts testified to by
either the therapists or Mr. Hodges demonstrate that he was
participating to the best of his ability and not "abusing" his
opportunity to be on probation.
The State relies on the "flexible nature of a probation
revocation hearing" to argue that the therapists were not required
to articulate a basi s for their conclusions.

However, it is

entirely consistent with the "flexible nature of a probation
revocation proceeding" (State's brief at 11) to require that
testimony have acieqiiate foundati on and reliability, that witnesses
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explain the bases for their conclusions, and that sufficient
evidence that the probationer violated a term of probation be
required.

See State v. Tulipaine, 596 P.2d 695, 696 (Ariz. 1979)

(no error where trial court refused to admit polygraph results at
probation revocation hearing due to lack of reliability of polygraph
examinations); People v. Maki, 704 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1985) (hearsay
must be reliable in order to introduce at probation revocation
hearing).
The concerns espoused in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388
(Utah 1989), that the factfinder might "abandon its responsibility"
and simply adopt the conclusions of experts without analyzing the
underlying facts are just as applicable to a probation revocation
hearing as they are to a trial.
In its brief, the State points out that "Dr. Cespedes
believed that defendant had been manipulative, using his medication
to justify his behavior and inability to progress in therapy."
Appellee's brief at 15. The transcript establishes that this
testimony by Dr. Cespedes actually related to the three-or-fourmonth period before Mr. Hodges went to the Veterans Administration
Hospital and had his medication changed2 and not the four-to-fivemonth period following the trip to the Veterans Administration
Hospital.

Rather than suggesting that Mr. Hodges was manipulative

following the trip to the hospital and change in medication,

2

As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 4, Appellant
went to the VA Hospital three or four months after entering
Bonneville and four or five months before the State filed the Order
to Show Cause in this case.
- 6 -

Dr. Cespedes' testimony demonstrates that Mr. Hodges behavior
improved during the last several months in the program.
Dr. Cespedes testified:
Sof Mr. Hodges' behavior did change after the
evaluation and changing in medication at the VA, but
that was more the result of a confrontation to get
him to lower or stop manipulating more than a change
in medication itself.
(T 9).

This testimony demonstrates that the therapy at Bonneville

was working and Mr. Hodges7 behavior was improving significantly
during his last several months in the program.
The State also points out that "Dr. Kramer found that
defendant lost motivation and that it was difficult to get him to
work hard and consistently."

Appellee's brief at 15. While the

State's depiction of the testimony suggests Mr. Hodges simply
stopped working, Dr. Kramer actually testified that Mr. Hodges would
try, then lose motivation, then try again for awhile, then lose
motivation again (T 21).

Again, Dr. Kramer offered no specific

examples nor any testimony as to how he assessed the level of
Mr. Hodges' motivation.

Specific examples, including the fact that

Dr. Kramer complimented Mr. Hodges several times on his progress
after returning from the evaluation at the Veterans Administration
Hospital, suggest that Mr. Hodges was motivated following the VA
evaluation.

As outlined further in Appellant's opening brief at 5,

18-19, Dr. Kramer also testified that he was unable to tell whether
assignments were completed correctly or the therapy was having an
impact on sexual arousal without use of the plethysmograph.
Therefore, Dr. Kramer's testimony demonstrates an inability to
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ascertain whether Mr. Hodges was benefiting from the therapy.
In the present case, where the therapists offered only
conclusions and no underlying examples of behavior which would
establish that Mr. Hodges was not participating and where Mr. Hodges
continued to participate to the best of his ability, society's
interest in reformation and Appellant's interest in remaining on
probation absent an "abuse of [that] opportunity" are both best
served by reinstating Appellant's probation.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order violating his probation and remand the case with
an order that probation be reinstated.
SUBMITTED this

3*

day of May, 1990.
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KAREN STAM
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JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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